Real Property -- Discontinuance of Dedicated Streets -- Disposition of Property by Ehringhaus, Susan Haughton
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 45 | Number 2 Article 21
2-1-1967
Real Property -- Discontinuance of Dedicated
Streets -- Disposition of Property
Susan Haughton Ehringhaus
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Susan H. Ehringhaus, Real Property -- Discontinuance of Dedicated Streets -- Disposition of Property, 45 N.C. L. Rev. 564 (1967).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol45/iss2/21
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Furthermore, it is far from certain that the effect of the present
holding will be confined to union activity within the purview of the
Railway Labor Act. Neither the Court38 nor the National Labor
Relations Board39 has hesitated to cite cases involving the act as
authority in otherwise unrelated areas of labor law. Thus the in-
stant decision may serve as precedent for similar appeals in other
industries, especially if they are found to be charged with a public
duty.
But regardless of future expansion, it is submitted that the
instant case creates an imbalance ° in the railway labor process that
unions are unlikely to overcome.41 If taking such a step is truly
necessary to maintain the vital function of carrier operations in the
present economic complex, it would seem to be a congressional
rather than judicial prerogative.
WILLIAm H. FAULK, JR.
Real Property-Discontinuance of Dedicated Streets-
Disposition of Property
Having been established by dedication, a street retains its status
as a public way until it is discontinued in a manner provided by law.'
Generally, statutes provide that streets may legally cease to exist
Id. at 228. In light of the Court's reasoning, should conduct that dis-
courages union membership be treated differently if the employer is able to
secure the approval of a lower court? This situation may arise in various
areas of labor law if the Florida East Coast decision is not limited to the
confines of the Railway Labor Act. For a consideration of such possibility
see note 39 infra and the accompanying text.
"E.g., Syres v. Oil Workers Intl Union, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955),
rev'd and remanded per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1956), in which the Supreme
Court cited Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) as
authority for reversing the lower court finding of "no jurisdiction" in a
racial discrimination case against the unions.
" E.g., Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1966), in which the board
cited Steele as authority for application of the duty of fair representation
in labor law.
o For the proposition that a balancing process is in order, i.e. weighing
the right to strike against the right of the employer to maintain his busi-
ness, see NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
"Mr. Justice White considered the majority opinion "very close to a
judgment that there shall be no strikes in the transportation business, a
judgment which Congress rejected in drafting the Railway Labor Act." 384
U.S. at 250.
1 11 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL COPPORATIONS § 30.182, at 101 (3d ed.
1964) [hereinafter cited as MCQUILLAN].
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upon vacation by the direct action of the public, authorities or by
withdrawal from dedication in the case of non-use or abandonment
by the public.' Discontinuance of a street by either method effectu-
ally extinguishes the public rights in it.8 At this point a question
arises as to the ownership of the property within the boundaries of
the street.4 Two conflicting answers are found in the North Caro-
lina statutes, both of which are applied by the North Carolina Su-
preme Court without regard to the inconsistency.
The North Carolina statutory scheme for vacation of a dedi-
cated street5 embodies the majority rule6 that when a street is
vacated, title to the street vests in those persons owning land abutt-
ing on it.7 A different answer obtains when a street is withdrawn
from dedication in North Carolina,' as the dedicator, not the abutt-
ing landowner, is presumed to own the fee.9 However, where a
street sought to be withdrawn was dedicated by a now-extinct corpo-
ration, the abutting landowners take the property.'" The North
22 ELLIOT, ROADS AND STREETS § 1172 (4th ed. 1926); 11 McQuILLAN
§§ 30.184, .185.
'2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.55, at 500 (Casner ed. 1964) [here-
inafter cited as AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY]; 11 McQuILLAN § 30.202(a).
" See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.55, at 500-02; 11
MCQUILLAN § 30.202(a).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(17) (Supp. 1965) authorizes, the county
boards of commissioners "to close any street or road or portion thereof...
that is now or may hereafter be opened or dedicated, either by recording of
a subdivision plat or otherwise." Similar power is given to cities to "close
any street or alley that is now or may hereafter be opened ... ." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 160-200(11) (1964). These statutes must be construed together
"so as to produce a harmonious body of legislation.... ." Town of Blowing
Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 371, 90 S.E.2d 898, 904 (1956).
' Cases cited note 26 infra and accompanying text.
'Upon the closing of a street or road in accordance with the pro-
visions hereof, all right, title and interest in such portion of such street
or road shall be conclusively presumed to be vested in those persons,
firms or corporations owning lots or parcels of land adjacent to such
portion of such street or road, and the title of each . . . shall, for the
width of the abutting land... extend to the center of such street or
road.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(17) (Supp. 1965).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964). Withdrawal of a dedicated street
is appropriate if the street "shall not have been actually opened and used by
the public within fifteen (15) years from and after the dedication there-
of. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964).
°Ibid.
o [Tihat where any corporation has dedicated any strip . . . of land
... and said dedicating corporation is not now in existence, it shall
be conclusively presumed that the said corporation has no further
right, title or interest in said strip ... the right, title and interest in
1967]
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Carolina court has expressly endorsed statutory disposition of street
property to the dedicator, as well as the principles underlying this
result," but by enforcing the statutory formula that allows the
abutting landowners to take the fee, the court has impliedly endorsed
a conflicting rationale and result.'
Disposition of street property to the dedicator is predicated on
the assumption that when a street is dedicated, the dedicator grants
easements of passage in the street to two distinct classes of persons, 1
but does not part with his title to it.Y4 When he 5 divides and plats
a tract of land into lots and streets, and sells lots with reference to
the plat,' 6 the sales operate as the dedicator's offer' 7 of the streets
to the public.' If the offer is accepted, 9 the public acquires ease-
said strip . . . shall be conclusively presumed to be vested in those
persons, firms or corporations owning lots ... adjacent thereto....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964). The statute doesn't provide how the fee
should vest in the adjacent landowners, that is, as tenants in common or
individually for the width of the abutting property. For a suggested answer,
see Lancaster, Withdrawal from Dedication and Closing of Roads, 13
N.C.B.A. BAR NOTES 5, 11 (Feb. 1962).
"1 See note 43 infra and accompanying text.
1 See note 45 infra and accompanying text.
" Technically, the result of a common law dedication was an easement
in the public, and not some particular person, though the term is used today
to encompass both public and private rights resulting from dedication of
a street. 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY H8 1099, 1103 (3d ed. 1939) [hereinafter
cited as TIFFANY].
1 "A common-law dedication . . . does not affect the ownership of the
land.... ." Id. § 1112, at 366; 11 MCQUILLAN §§ 33.03, at 635, 33.66, at 807,
33.68, at 809.
1" Only the owner can dedicate land, and he must evidence a clear and
unequivocal intent to do so. 4 TIFFANY §§ 1100-01.
"The plat does not have to be recorded to effect a valid dedication.
Somersette v. Stanaland, 202 N.C. 685, 163 S.E.2d 804 (1932).
'" The offer is revocable before acceptance by the public. Steadman v.
Town of Pinetops, 251 N.C. 509, 112 S.E.2d 102 (1960); Rowe v. City of
Durham, 235 N.C. 158, 69 S.E.2d 171 (1952).
18 Wofford v. Highway Comm'n, 263 N.C. 677, 140 S.E.2d 376 (1965);
Steadman v. Town of Pinetops, 251 N.C. 509, 112 S.E.2d 102 (1960) ; Town
of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 90 S.E.2d 898 (1956) ; Broocks
v. Muirhead, 223 N.C. 227, 25 S.E.2d 889 (1943); Home Real Estate Loan
& Ins. Co. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 216 N.C. 778, 7 S.E.2d 13 (1940).
This method of dedicating streets is by far the most common method of
doing so. 11 MCQUILLAN § 33.22. Compare Todd v. White, 246 N.C. 59,
97 S.E.2d 439 (1957). There the court held that a sale with reference to a
plat did not effect a dedication where the dedicator expressly reserved the
right to control the streets.
1" The majority rule and the rule in North Carolina is that there must be
an offer and an acceptance by the public to constitute a valid dedication of
land to public use. E.g., Steadman v. Town of Pinetops, 251 N.C. 509, 112
S.E.2d 102 (1960); Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 90
S.E.2d 898 (1956); 11 MCQUILLAN § 33.02, at 628, and cases cited therein.
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ments20 in the streets lasting until the streets are discontinued.2 '
The sale of lots with reference to a plat also vests in every purchaser
an easement in any street shown on the plat necessary for reason-
able access to his property." Regardless of acceptance or abandon-
ment of public rights in a particular street, 3 a purchaser's easement
terminates only when the use of that street is no longer needed as
an access route.-4 Though the street property is subject to these
In North Carolina, acceptance by the public can be shown by the public
authority's exercising acts of control over the streets, such as opening, im-
proving, or maintaining them. Steadman v. Town of Pinetops, 251 N.C. 509,
112 S.E.2d 102 (1960); Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364,
90 S.E.2d 898 (1956).
" In North Carolina, the dedicator "is equitably estopped . . . in refer-
ence to the public . . . from denying the existence of the easement thus
created." Green v. Miller, 161 N.C. 25, 30, 76 S.E. 505, 507 (1912).
(Emphasis added.) See 11 MCQUILLAN §§ 33.66, .68; 4 TIFFANY § 1112.
Statutes in a few states provide that the public acquires the title to the
streets when they are dedicated. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 670; CoLo. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 139-1-7 (1963); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 711.07 (Page 1954);
OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 515 (1959). See generally 11 McQUILLAN
§§ 33.03, at 635, 33.69.
21 "[N]o person shall have any right, or cause of action . . . [after a
street is withdrawn from dedication], to enforce any public . . . easement
therein." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964). To the same effect is N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 153-9(17) (Supp. 1965) which implies that public rights are ex-
tinguished upon vacation of the street, by giving "all right, title and interest
in ... the street . . ." to the abutting landowners.
" The purchaser
has a right in the street beyond that which is enjoyed by the general
public, or by himself as a member of the public, and different in kind,
since egress from and ingress to his own property is a necessity
peculiar to himself. The right is in the nature of an easement ap-
purtenant to the property...
Sanders v. Town of Smithfield, 221 N.C. 166, 170, 19 S.E.2d 630, 633
(1942). Accord, Wofford v. Highway Comm'n, 263 N.C. 677, 14 S.E.2d
376 (1965); Steadman v. Town of Pinetops, 251 N.C. 509, 112 S.E.2d 102
(1960); Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 90 S.E.2d 898
(1956); Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N.C. 227, 25 S.E.2d 889 (1943); Home
Real Estate Loan & Ins. Co. v. Town of Carolina Beach, 216 N.C. 778, 7
S.E.2d 13 (1940). See generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.54, at
493-94; 28 C.J.S. Easements §§ 39, 88 (1941); 11 MCQJILLAN § 33.73; 3
TIFFANY § 800. Abridgment or destruction of this easement by the public
is a compensable property taking. Sanders v. Town of Smithfield, 221 N.C.
166, 170, 19 S.E.2d 630, 633 (1945).
2" Owens v. Elliot, 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 83 (1962) ; Janicki v. Lorek,
255 N.C. 53, 120 S.E.2d 413 (1961); Russell v. Coggin, 232 N.C. 674, 62
S.E.2d 70 (1950); Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N.C. 227, 25 S.E.2d 889
(1943).
" Janicki v. Lorek, 255 N.C. 53, 120 S.E.2d 413 (1961) ; Evans v. Horne,
226 N.C. 581, 39 S.E.2d 612 (1946). The withdrawal statute has "no appli-
cation in any case where the continued use of any strip of land dedicated
for street . . . purposes shall be necessary to afford convenient ingress or
egress to any lot . . . sold . . . by the dedicator of such street. . . ." N.C.
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easements, the dedicator's title is unaffected except to the extent that
the easements, for their duration, are encumbrances on it.25 Hence,
if the dedicator grants only easements, he obviously should be en-
titled to the reversion when the easements cease.
However, in most jurisdictions the property reverts to the abutt-
ing landowners instead of the dedicator.26 The rationale of such
disposition is based on the widely recognized principle that when a
dedicator sells a lot abutting on a street, he is presumed, in the
absence of express words to the contrary,2 7 to convey with the lot
the title to the center of the street.28 Thus, it is the abutting land-
GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964). Similarly, a street cannot be vacated unless
it appears "that no individual owning property in the vicinity of said street
.will thereby be deprived of reasonable means of ingress an egress to
his property.... ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(17) (Supp. 1965). However,
adverse possession can run against the holder of the access easement as well
as against the holder of the fee in the street if the public has not accepted
the street or if it has abandoned an accepted street. City of Salisbury v.
Barnhardt, 249 N.C. 549, 107 S.E.2d 297 (1959); Gault v. Town of Lake
Waccamaw, 200 N.C. 593, 158 S.E.2d 104 (1931).
'" See note 14 supra.
"
0E.g., Main v. Legnitto, 230 Cal. App. 2d 667, 41 Cal. Rptr. 223 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1964); Gorby v. McEndarfer, 135 Ind. App. 74, 191 N.E.2d 786
(1963); Board of Comm'rs v. Clark, 157 Kan. 132, 138 P.2d 449 (1943);
Valoppi v. Detroit Eng'r & Mach. Co., 339 Mich. 674, 64 N.W.2d 884
(1954); American Steel & Wire Co. v. City of St Louis, 354 Mo. 692, 190
S.W.2d 919 (1945); Greenberg v. L.I. Snodgrass Co., 161 Ohio St. 351, 119
N.E.2d 292 (1954); Fenton v. Cedar Lumber & Hardware Co., 17 Utah
2d 99, 404 P.2d 966 (1965); Bond v. Green, 189 Va. 23, 52 S.E.2d 169
(1949); Woehler v. George, 65 Wash. 2d 519, 398 P.2d 167 (1965). See
generally 2 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.55, at 501; 11 MCQUILLAN
§ 30.202(a), at 161-63; 3 TIFFANY § 931.
7 E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Milner, 275 Ala. 104, 152 So. 2d 431 (1962);
Rahn v. Hess, 378 Pa. 264, 106 A.2d 461 (1954); Williams v. Miller, 184
Va. 274, 35 S.E.2d 127 (1945).
. E.g., Taylor v. Continental Southern Corp., 104 Cal. App. 2d 425, 233
P.2d 577 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951); St. Clair Co. Housing Authority v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 387 Ill. 180, 56 N.E.2d 357 (1944); Hylton v.
Belcher, 290 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1956); Kreamer v. Harmon, 336 S.W.2d
561 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960); Burkett v. Ross, 227 Miss. 315, 86 So. 2d 33
(1956); Skrmetta v. Moore, 202 Miss. 585, 30 So. 2d 53 (1947); Luneau
v. MacDonald, 103 N.H. 273, 173 A.2d 44 (1961); Snyder v. County of
Monroe, 2 Misc. 2d 946, 153 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Perkins v.
Village of Mexico, 200 Misc. 2d 294, 102 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1950);
Finlaw v. Hunter, 87 Ohio App. 543, 96 N.E.2d 319 (1949); McLaughlin
v. Cybulski, 192 Pa. Super. 7, 159 A.2d 14 (1960); Rahn v. Hess, 378 Pa.
264, 106 A.2d 461 (1954); Newman v. Mayor of City of Newport, 73 R.I.
385, 57 A.2d 173 (1948); State v. Williams, 161 Tex. 1, 335 S.W.2d 834
(1960); City of Houston v. Hughes, 284 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955); Heller v. Woodley, 202 Va. 994, 121 S.E.2d 527 (1961). See gen-




owner and not the dedicator whose property is subject to the private
access 29 and public30 easements created by dedicating a street. Conse-
quently, when a street is no longer needed as an access route and
when the public surrenders its rights in it, the abutting landowner
is entitled to the fee in that portion of the street adjacent to his
property.3 '
The point of divergence of the North Carolina statutes is the
determination of whether to accept the majority rule that abutting
landowners acquire title or to assume that they acquire only access
easements. The withdrawal statute,32 excluding that portion dealing
with dedication by now-extinct corporations,3 3 apparently codifies
the view that the abutting landowner has only an access easement.
Hence, title to the dedicated street remains in the dedicator,3 4 and
the unencumbered fee necessarily reverts to him when the public35
and private3 6 easements cease. But both the vacation statute37 and
the provision in the withdrawal statute relating to streets dedicated
by now-extinct corporations"' embody the majority rule that the
abutting landowner is entitled to the reversion.39 The implication is
that he, not the dedicator, held the title to the street during the con-
tinuance of the public and private easements.
The inconsistency, however, is not confined to the statutes, for
the North Carolina Supreme Court has enforced statutory disposi-
tion of street property both to the dedicator 0 and to the abutting
landowner 4 but on the basis of reasoning that militates against any-
one other than the dedicator taking the property.42 The court has
"' See note 22 supra. Similarly, the abutting landowner acquires not only
his title to the street adjacent to his property, but also an access easement
over the other abutting landowners' fees in whatever streets he needs for
purposes of ingress to and egress from his property.
See note 20 supra.
s See note 26 supra.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964).
"Ibid.
'See note 14 supra.
"See note 21 supra.
The private access easement must have terminated before the street
can be discontinued. See note 24 supra.
IT N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(17) (Supp. 1965).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964).
"See notes 7 & 10 supra.
40Russell v. Coggins, 232 N.C. 674, 62 S.E.2d 70 (1950); Sheets v.
Walsh, 217 N.C. 32, 6 S.E.2d 817 (1940).
'* Steadman v. Town of Pinetops, 251 N.C. 509, 112 S.E.2d 102 (1960).
,See note 43 infra.
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unequivocally declared that the abutting landowner acquires nothing
more than a general access easement.43 Thus, when a street is dis-
continued, the dedicator should always be entitled to the property
simply because, under this view, he never parted with his title to
it.14 How, then, can the court give effect to a statute allowing the
abutting landowners to take the street property when, on the basis
of the court's own reasoning, it follows that the dedicator is thereby
deprived of his property without due process of law?" Yet disposi-
tion of street property to abutting landowners was squarely upheld
in Steadman v. Town of Pinetops.46
In trying to effectuate the different statutory mandates while
simultaneously adhering to the principles it has announced, the
court has produced a body of case law that is of little assistance in
determining the validity of a title to street property at any given
time. The statutory conflict could be resolved and a practical solu-
tion effected by an amendment to the withdrawal statute47 provid-
ing that the abutting landowner takes the fee in the street upon
withdrawal, regardless of who the dedicator was. The abutting land-
owner has an obvious interest in having the strip of land attach to
his property when the street is discontinued, while the same strip of
land without the lots adjacent to it would be of little practical im-
portance to the dedicator. Assuming that lots with street frontage
are more valuable than ones without, the abutting landowner prob-
ably paid more for a lot with this benefit and, consequently, should
""[T]he owner of abutting property has a right in the street
[which] is in the nature of an easement appurtenant to the property ..
Sanders v. Town of Smithfield, 221 N.C. 166, 170, 19 S.E.2d 630, 633(1942). (Emphasis added.) "Purchasers of lots sold with reference to the
recorded map . .. acquire vested rights to have all and each of the streets
shown on the map kept open." Town of Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243
N.C. 364, 368, 90 S.E.2d 898, 902 (1956). "The original owners, having
sold lots with reference to the plat . . . are estopped to deny, as against
the purchasers of lots, the existence of the easement in ... a purchaser of a
lot. . . ." Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N.C. 227, 232, 25 S.E.2d 889, 892
(1943). (Emphasis added.)
"See notes 14 and 22 supra.
""The Legislature cannot sanction the taking of one's property unless(a) in satisfaction of a legal obligation, or (b) for a public purpose (citing
cases); and when taken for a public purpose, just compensation must be
paid." In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 261 N.C. 1, 8, 134 S.E.2d 85, 91 (1964).
According to the reasoning of the North Carolina Supreme Court, statutory
disposition of street property to the abutting landowners falls into neither of
these categories.
" 251 N.C. 509, 112 S.E.2d 102 (1960).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964).
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be entitled to his money's worth when the street is discontinued."
To be certain that the abutting landowners' property rights under
the statutes are protected from judicial interference,49 both the with-
drawal statue"0 and the vacation statute51 could also provide that the
abutting landowners take the fee in the streets unless the dedicator
expressly reserved it. Such an amendment would negate the possi-
bility of the dedicator's due process argument against the abutting
landowners who statutorily would be entitled to the street property.
Should the dedicator wish to retain the fee when he dedicates streets,
he is required to do no more than make his desire explicit to protect
his interests from application of the statutes.8 2 These amendments
would definitively resolve the existing conceptual conflict evidenced
by the court's treatment of the problem, and would eliminate any
necessity for time-consuming litigation of rights under the statutes
as they now stand.
SUSAN HAUGHTON EHRINGHAUS
"For a good discussion of the reasons why such a rule should apply,
see Finlaw v. Hunter, 87 Ohio App. 543, 96 N.E.2d 319 (1949).
'" That is, judicial interference because of the constitutional issue in-
volved.
°N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-96 (1964).
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-9(17) (Supp. 1965).
" Such a requirement is not an unreasonable burden on the dedicator.
If he has not reserved the fee, he will be presumed to have surrendered it
to the abutting landowners.
1967]
